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ABSTRACT
This research seeks to investigate the connection between market 
capitalisation and the voting pattern related to proposals about 
executive compensation and directors’ election, using data about 
banks from the U.S.A. concerning the 2003–2013 period. Our 
findings indicate that there is a direct relationship between voting 
pattern and market capitalisation, suggesting that they are mutually 
interdependent. When the market value of the bank increases 
(decreases), the support given by shareholders through their votes 
in meetings increases (decreases) as well. Also, when the approval 
showed by shareholders to managerial proposals through their voting 
decisions gets higher (lower), the market value of the bank gets higher 
(lower) too.
1. Introduction
Assessing the causes and consequences of the voting pattern disclosed by shareholders in 
corporate meetings is a major concern for researchers and practitioners, with a special focus 
on votes related to executive compensation and directors’ election. In particular, it has been 
argued that the market valuation of the firm can be considered an explanatory factor for 
the voting decisions (Ertimur, Ferri, & Oesch, 2013). On the other hand, it has also been 
stated that the relational influence is observed on the contrary, so that voting decisions exert 
some sort of effect over the market capitalisation (Fischer, Gramlich, Miller, & White, 2009). 
That is to say that the existing conclusions are not homogeneous and more investigation is 
clearly necessary on this subject (Choi, Fisch, & Kahan, 2008).
Lately, the focus has turned towards the banking business, as a consequence of recent 
corporate scandals (Fiordelisi, Soana, & Schwizer, 2013). That is why there is some specific 
investigation regarding voting pattern in the banking industry (Yahr, 2013). In addition, it 
has to be pointed out that banking activity has been traditionally considered a suitable target 
for research purposes, taking into account that its activity is deployed into an environment 
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characterised by important information asymmetries, where firms act as intermediaries 
and designers of new financial products that relate to crucial aspects of any economic 
activity, including payment and risk management issues (Allen & Santomero, 1997, 2001; 
Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993). Particularly, the U.S. banking industry tends to attract the 
focus of investigators in so far as there has been an intense deregulatory progression affect-
ing this particular sector (Lounsbury, Hirsch, & Klinkerman, 1998; Marquis & Lounsbury, 
2007).
The aim of this paper is to analyse the link between the market capitalisation of the firm 
and the voting pattern regarding proposals on executive compensation and directors’ elec-
tion, focusing on firms from the U.S. banking industry and proposing that these variables 
are mutually interdependent. The manuscript is organised as follows. The second section 
provides a theoretical framework for the investigation and states the propositions to be 
tested. The third section supplies a description of the data-set, and it also describes the 
variables and the model to be used. The forth section discloses the results. Finally, the fifth 
section discusses and concludes.
2. Theoretical framework
Addressing the determinants of the voting decisions and their connection to corporate 
performance is one of the major concerns for researchers into the corporate governance 
field (Ng, Wang, & Zaiats, 2009), with a special prevalence of studies analysing proposals 
on executive compensation and directors’ election. When it comes to considering the vote 
direction regarding executive compensation, the say on pay policy has become a prevalent 
topic through academic research, with some evidence of its linkage to corporate govern-
ance (Cai & Walkling, 2011; Cuñat, Gine, & Guadalupe, 2013). Actually, it has been proved 
that proxy advisors are prone to non-pro votes when a company with bad performance is 
characterised by high executive compensation (Ertimur et al., 2013).
On the other hand, the vote direction regarding directors’ election has been related to 
corporate governance (Cai, Garner, & Walkling, 2009; Hillman, Shropshire, Certo, Dalton, 
& Dalton, 2011). Actually, there is a prominent research line that proposes votes for direc-
tors’ election as an indirect measure of reputational performance (Bernile & Jarrell, 2009; 
Ertimur, Ferri, & Maber, 2012; Ferri & Maber, 2013), which is a complex and multidimen-
sional concept (Pineiro-Chousa, Vizcaíno-González, & López-Cabarcos, 2016). In this same 
regard, some insights have been provided about how proxy advisors build their voting advice 
regarding directors’ election, with mixed and not concluding results (Choi et al., 2008), 
indicating that more research in this area is clearly needed. So, we argue that the market 
capitalisation exerts some sort of influence over the voting pattern.
Hypothesis 1: The market value of the firm is a key explanatory factor for the voting pattern 
observed in corporate meetings.
In addition, the positive influence of shareholders’ proxy access over financial performance 
has been established (Becker, Bergstresser, & Subramanian, 2013), as well as its influence 
over shareholders’ wealth (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1989; Dodd & Warner, 1983). In particu-
lar, it has been shown how a strong degree of support disclosed through voting behaviour 
is followed by weak reactions in the market when news about executive compensation is 
publicised (Fischer et al., 2009). For this reason, we hypothesise that the voting pattern is 
an explanatory factor for the market capitalisation of the firm.
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Hypothesis 2: The voting pattern observed in corporate meetings is a key explanatory factor 
for the market value of the firm.
As a consequence, driven out from the two propositions stated above, we argue that the 
market value of the company and the voting pattern observed in its corporate meetings 
can be analysed as interdependent variables that are significant in explaining each other’s 
behaviour.
Hypothesis 3: The market capitalisation of the firm and the voting pattern observed in corporate 
meeting are mutually interdependent.
3. Data and method
3.1. Data sample
The voting data refer to managerial proposals on executive compensation and directors’ 
election, captured from the non-profit and non-partisan organisation ProxyDemocracy, 
which collects votes disclosed by funds through U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) N-PC filings. This organisation has been lately considered an appropriate supplier of 
this type of data for research purposes (Burns & Minnick, 2013; Pineiro-Chousa, Vizcaíno-
González, & Caby, 2015). In addition, and following Vizcaíno and Chousa (2016), these 
voting data are completed with financial and accounting data collected from Bankscope, 
which is a well-known database that includes comprehensive statistics regarding banks all 
over the world. Crossing data from the two data sources, the final sample comprises 95,234 
votes regarding 309 banks, and concerning the 11-year period from 2003–2013.
3.2. Model
In order to compute the bidirectional influence between the market capitalisation of the 
bank and the voting pattern, we propose a system of simultaneous equations suitable for a 
two-stage least squares estimation (2S.L.S.):
 
 
Focusing on equation (1), mit is the market capitalisation of bank i in year t, α1 is the constant 
term; β1 is the estimated coefficient of the 2S.L.S. regression for the variable v that repre-
sents the voting pattern; θ1 are the estimated coefficients for z1it, which are the instrumental 
variables of this first equation; γ1 are the estimated coefficients of the 2S.L.S. regression for 
the control variables xit; δt are year dummies; and 휀1it is the error term.
Turning the sights towards equation (2), vit is the voting pattern observed in meetings 
held by bank i in year t, α2 is the constant term; β2 is the estimated coefficient of the 2S.L.S. 
regression for the variable m that represents the market capitalisation; 휃
2
 are the estimated 
coefficients for z2it, which are the instrumental variables of this second equation; γ2 are 
the estimated coefficients of the 2S.L.S. regression for the control variables xit; δt are year 
dummies; and 휀
2it is the error term.
(1)mit = 훼1 + 훽1vit + 휃1z1it + 훾1xit + 훿t + 휀1it
(2)vit = 훼2 + 훽2mit + 휃2z2it + 훾2xit + 훿t + 휀2it
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The two β-coefficients allow us to investigate the relationship between the two key vari-
ables in our research, that is, the interdependence between the market capitalisation of the 
bank and the voting pattern observed in its meetings.
3.3. Variables
3.3.1. Endogenous variables
The endogenous variable of the first equation is computed as the natural log of the market 
capitalisation for a certain bank and at the end of a given year (L.M.C.). Regarding the sec-
ond equation, the endogenous variable is a measure of the voting pattern. In order to make 





, where nov stands for the total 
number of votes emitted in meetings held for a certain bank and year, and nof stands for 
the total number of funds that emitted at least one vote for any of the managerial proposals 
presented in meetings held by a given bank and for a certain year. Thus, this measure informs 
about the average number of votes by each fund. Next, we compute the ratio 1+f
1+nf
− 1, where 
f stands for the proportion of favourable votes received by a certain bank in meetings held 
in a given year, and nf stands for the proportion of non-favourable votes, including both 
‘against’ and ‘abstain’ votes, for the same bank and year. Aggregating ‘against’ and ‘abstain’ 
votes is a typical method used by governance industry in order to compute a measure of 
dissension (Gregory-Smith & Main, 2013). As a consequence, this measure informs about 
the degree of approval given to managerial proposals. If it takes a negative value, it means 
that managerial proposals are mostly rejected. On the other hand, if its value is positive it 
indicates that managerial proposals are mostly supported. Finally, we multiply the average 
number of votes by fund plus the degree of approval in order to acquire a measure of the 
voting pattern observed in meetings held by the banks included in our sample.
3.3.2. Control variables
This is a set of variables that are included as explanatory variables in both equations of our 
system. So, they are determinants for the explanation of the market capitalisation and for 
the explanation of the voting pattern. We consider five different control variables:
•  Price to earnings ratio (P.E.R.): ratio relating the market capitalisation to the net profit, 
for a certain bank and year.
•  Return on assets (R.O.A.): ratio relating the operating profit to the book value of assets, 
for a certain bank and year.
•  Net profit per share (N.P.P.S.): the amount of the net profit divided by the total number 
of shares, for a certain bank and year.
•  Leverage (L.E.V.): ratio relating the book value of debt to the book value of equity, for 
a certain bank and year.
•  Positive earnings (P.E.): a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the bank had positive 
earnings in the previous year, and takes the value 0 otherwise.
A reasonable link can be established between each one of the control variables and each one 
of the endogenous variables. For example, a company with positive earnings in the previous 
year or with a low leverage ratio is likely to have higher market capitalisation. In addition, 
a company with a  higher return on assets or a higher price to earnings ratio is expected to 
receive higher support in its meetings.
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3.3.3. Instrumental variables
The first set of instrumental variables are incorporated as determinants in the first equation 
in order to explain the behaviour of the market capitalisation, but are not determinants in 
the second equation for the explanation of the voting pattern. This first set is compounded 
by two different instruments:
•  Assets (L.N.A.): the natural log of the book value of assets for a certain bank and year, 
as a measure of the size of the bank.
•  Tobin’s q ratio (Q): we compute the Tobin’s q as a ratio relating the market value to 
the book value of the bank’s assets. In order to estimate the market value of the bank’s 
assets, we calculate the book value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the 
book value of equity. This calculation of the Tobin’s q ratio is widely used in academic 
literature (Jiao, 2010; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997).
The second set of instrumental variables takes part in the second equation, so that these 
variables are used as determinants for the voting pattern, but are not included in the first 
equation. This second set is also formed by two distinct instruments:
•  Votes (L.N.V.): the natural log of the total votes emitted by funds in meetings held by 
a certain bank in a given year.
•  Dividends per share (D.P.S.): the amount of dividends, divided by the total number of 
shares, for a certain bank and year.
A reasonable connection between each set of instruments and their respective instrumented 
variable can be easily established. Thus, the total assets or the Tobin’s q ratio are likely to be 
influencing the market value of the firm. Similarly, the total votes or the dividends per share 
are expected to be affecting the voting pattern observed in corporate meetings.
4. Results
In Table 1 we provide summary statistics broken down by year about the two key variables 
in our research: the natural log of the market capitalisation and the voting pattern ratio, 
computed as explained before.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for market capitalisation and voting pattern.
notes: in this table we provide the main descriptive statistics of the natural log of the market capitalisation, as well as the 
voting pattern, for each of the 11 years in our sample. the sample contains 95,234 votes for 309 banks in the 2003–2013 
period.
source: authors’ calculations.
Market capitalisation Voting pattern
Year Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
2003 129 6.0094 1.8793 2.5306 11.5235 3 0.4304 0.5310 0.0000 1.0239
2004 140 6.0999 1.8427 3.4117 11.8423 72 0.9992 0.8020 −0.7484 2.6082
2005 162 6.0590 1.7724 3.5897 11.8596 83 0.9870 0.7388 −0.3881 2.7282
2006 169 6.2344 1.7799 3.5147 12.0559 84 1.1864 0.7575 −0.6931 2.7726
2007 192 5.9663 1.8442 2.9124 11.9907 174 0.8717 0.9108 −1.1286 2.7081
2008 189 5.5084 1.9108 2.2394 11.6757 163 0.8402 0.7349 −1.2825 2.7726
2009 235 5.4093 1.9583 0.9937 12.0089 197 0.9445 0.7618 −1.0986 2.6391
2010 236 5.7604 1.9885 1.5455 12.0187 226 0.8445 0.8008 −0.8047 2.8332
2011 236 5.7520 1.9643 1.3479 11.8868 159 0.2152 0.8199 −1.3863 2.8332
2012 232 5.9965 1.8820 0.9738 12.1003 172 0.2621 1.0079 −1.4166 2.7081
2013 217 6.3917 1.8555 1.0210 12.3848 184 0.3498 0.9228 −1.3195 2.8622
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In addition, in Table 2 we supply aggregate summary statistics for the fundamental 
variables in our research.
In Table 3 we provide information about the correlations between the core variables in 
our estimation. If we focus on the two main variables, the market capitalisation and the 
voting pattern, we can observe a positive relationship between them. This means that, as 
long as the market value of the bank increases (decreases), the support given by shareholders 
through their votes in meetings increases (decreases) as well. Moreover, when the approval 
showed by shareholders to managerial proposals through their voting decisions gets higher 
(lower), the market value of the bank gets higher (lower) too.
We estimate the system of simultaneous equations described in Section 3.2., suitable for 
2S.L.S. estimation, with the aim of exploring the relationship between the two endogenous 
variables of our study described in Section 3.3.1. In order to conquer that objective, we use 
the control variables described in Section 3.3.2. In addition, we use as instrumental varia-
bles the two sets described in Section 3.3.3. Finally, we take into account year fixed effects 
incorporating a year dummy for each one of the 11 years in our sample. We also provide 
the p-values associated with the standard errors. The results are presented in Table 4.
The estimated coefficient of the second stage for the voting pattern is significant at the 
5% level in explaining the natural log of market capitalisation (β = 0.4638, p = 0.003). In 
addition, the estimated coefficient of the second stage for the natural log of the market 
capitalisation is significant at the 5% level in explaining the voting pattern (β = 0.0985, 
p = 0.000). Both of these referred coefficients are positive, which is consistent with the 
previous analysis of the correlation between the two variables driven out from the figures 
of Table 3.
In order to test the robustness of the results, we calculate the Hansen-Sargan statistic in 
order to check for over-identifying restrictions (Davidson & MacKinnon, 2004). If this test 
results as significant, it may be informing about some identification failure in the equations 
in our model, or it may be related to the presence of invalid instruments. Once the test is 
computed, we observe that this statistic shows a value of 0.580 (p = 0.7482), indicating that 
the null hypothesis should not be rejected and, as a consequence, the instruments selected 
are suitable for the estimation. In addition, we compute an F-statistic for the joint signifi-
cance of all variables, the exogenous variables and the year dummies, and all of them result 
as statistically significant at a 5% level of significance. Also, we check if the rank condition 
Table 2. summary statistics of the main variables included in the estimation.
notes: this table collects summary statistics of the key variables taking part in our study. the sample contains 95,234 votes 
for 309 banks in the 2003–2013 period.
source: authors’ calculations.
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
L.m.c. 2137 5.9042 1.9078 0.9738 12.3848
voting 1517 0.7014 0.8951 −1.4166 2.8622
P.E.R. 2315 16.4737 121.7681 −2,913.1500 3,184.7390
R.o.a. 2380 0.0126 0.0427 −0.3530 0.6888
n.P.P.s. 2316 0.5837 22.3738 −901.5190 219.2830
L.E.v. 2380 0.8633 0.1332 0.0000 1.0004
P.E. 2152 0.8620 0.3450 0.0000 1.0000
L.n.a. 2380 8.0590 1.9048 1.1939 15.9808
Q. 2330 1.0583 0.4051 0.1279 7.8060
L.n.v. 1517 3.1146 1.2689 0.0000 7.6401
D.P.s. 2126 0.7485 4.0622 0.0000 91.6440
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is verified by computing the matrixes shown in Table 5. Using the checkreg3 command in 
Stata, we find that equations (1) and (2) and the system of equations are correctly identified 
(Baum, 2007).
According to these results, we can conclude that the two key variables in our study, that 
is, the natural log of the market capitalisation and the voting pattern, are significant in 
explaining each other’s behaviour. Furthermore, their relationship is positive, which means 
that there is a direct influence between them. So, an increase (decrease) in market capital-
isation results in an increase (decrease) of the support disclosed by funds to managerial 
performance; and a higher (lower) approval of managerial proposals by funds results in 
higher (lower) market capitalisation. These findings confirm the propositions established 
in the theoretical background section.
Table 3. correlations between core variables used in the research.
notes: With this table we provide correlations between the key variables used in this study. the sample contains 95,234 
votes for 309 banks in the 2003–2013 period.
source: authors’ calculations.
  L.M.C. Voting P.E.R. R.O.A. N.P.P.S. L.E.V. P.E.
L.m.c. 1.0000
voting 0.2810 1.0000
P.E.R. −0.0046 0.0254 1.0000
R.o.a. 0.1826 0.0153 0.0260 1.0000
n.P.P.s. 0.0884 −0.0257 0.0049 0.0803 1.0000
L.E.v. −0.0841 0.0013 −0.0670 −0.5010 −0.0252 1.0000
P.E. 0.2298 −0.0297 0.0681 0.1939 0.1117 −0.0620 1.0000
Table 4. Results of two-stage least squares estimation.
notes: this table presents the results from the 2s.L.s. estimation of our simultaneous equations model. the sample contains 
95,234 votes for 309 banks in the 2003–2013 period. 
*coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level.
source: authors’ calculations.
First stage Second stage
  L.M.C. Voting L.M.C. Voting
coefficient p coefficient p coefficient p coefficient p
L.m.c. 0.0985* 0.000
voting 0.4638* 0.003
L.n.a. 0.9263* 0.000 0.0919* 0.000 0.8831* 0.000
Q. 0.1384 0.148 0.0877 0.542 0.0970 0.443
P.E.R. 0.0001 0.317 0.0003 0.101 0.0000 0.917 0.0003 0.118
R.o.a. 6.4332* 0.000 0.3580 0.780 6.2679* 0.000 0.2181 0.803
n.P.P.s. 0.0022* 0.000 −0.0003 0.689 0.0024* 0.001 −0.0006 0.487
L.E.v. −2.1078* 0.000 0.0344 0.895 −2.1238* 0.000 0.2007 0.411
P.E. 0.5495* 0.000 −0.0563 0.471 0.5755* 0.000 −0.1158 0.145
L.n.v. 0.0751* 0.000 0.1639* 0.000 0.1574* 0.000
D.P.s. −0.0036 0.277 −0.0061 0.223 −0.0058 0.260
R-squared 0.9371 0.2724 0.8933 0.2546
adj R-squared 0.9360 0.2591
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5. Discussion and conclusions
Using a sample of banks from the U.S., we study the relationship between the market value of 
the firm and the voting pattern observed in corporate meetings from 2003– 2013. With that 
purpose, we build a system of simultaneous equations, suitable for a 2S.L.S. estimation. Our 
results demonstrate that the market capitalisation of the bank and the voting pattern are signif-
icant in explaining each other’s performance. The empirical evidence shows a direct relation, 
so a raise (decline) in market capitalisation turns into a raise (decline) of the support revealed 
by shareholders to managerial proposals; and a higher (lower) agreement with managerial 
proposals disclosed by shareholders results in higher (lower) market capitalisation.
This investigation focuses on the relationship between voting pattern and market 
capitalisation. However, the influence of the voting pattern may be observable through other 
financial indicators of the corporate performance. As a consequence, future research should 
take this suggestion as a starting point to reach a full characterisation of the link between 
voting pattern and corporate performance. Also, this study does not consider the owner-
ship structure. However, future research should address this issue comparing concentrated 
ownership to dispersed ownership, and comparting public owned firms to private firms.
Finally, the outcome of this study should be framed into the context of the research 
environment. Thus, regarding the voting pattern, it is worthwhile mentioning that the U.S. 
banking sector is characterised by a one-tier structure where the firm is governed by only 
one corporate body that assumes management and supervision tasks. Also, concerning 
market capitalisation, it needs to be pointed out that the U.S. offers well-developed and deep 
financial markets, with a high degree of liquidity. So, future research should investigate if 
Table 5. coefficients matrix.
notes: this table presents the endogenous coefficients matrix and the exogenous coefficients matrix. the sample contains 
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the findings of this study can be generalised, considering different research environments, 
including two-tier board structures and less developed financial markets.
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